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Abstract: 
Faulty constructed and leaking buildings as a result of construction practices 
in the 1990s and 2000s are costing New Zealand billions of dollars in damage  
in lost production and repair. To improve the poor quality of building 
construction, the NZ Government over the last 10 years has implemented a 
range of legal and financial policies. The Building Amendment Bill No 3 is one 
such piece of legislation and the latest to be passed by the NZ Parliament on 
the matter.  
 
The legislation is set to further change building and construction regulations 
here in New Zealand in that it will put in place a code of ethics for the newly 
implemented Licensed Building Practitioner scheme, a scheme that requires all 
builders constructing certain types of work to be licensed.  It will introduce 
“risk based” consenting process for low risk building work, placing more 
accountability and responsibility on designers, building owners and builders 
to build correctly, and move responsibility (and liability) away from where it 
largely resides at the moment, on the shoulders of the Local Council 
(Territorial Authority).  
 
This paper will provide a brief history of the controversy surrounding building 
under performance here in New Zealand. It will analyse the submissions to the 
Parliamentary Select Committee overseeing the legislation from the various 
stakeholders within the industry and evaluate the contribution it will make in 
the long road back to quality building. The paper supports the view that the 
transfer of responsibility, of which this Building Amendment bill is a part, runs 
the risk of failure unless legislative and educational systems supporting the 
intended role have had time to coalesce and prove their effectiveness. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Building Amendment Bill (No 3) and its subsequent enactment as the 
Building Amendment Bill 2012 forms a part of a long line of other legislation 
enacted to counter the poor performance of the NZ building industry following 
the introduction of the performance based NZ Building Act in 1991. The self-
regulatory nature of this Act combined with other factors, such as the rapid 
introduction of new building materials and systems –some with dubious 
durability capability, changes to timber durability requirements, poor quality 
construction methods, inappropriate design, lax documentation and 
supervision all combined to create many more defective buildings than had 
been the case in the past. In 2001, a report by the author [1] that surveyed 
some 287 pre-purchase reports indicated some 60% of the dwellings 
inspected let in moisture through the cladding to an unacceptable degree. 
Whilst buildings in New Zealand had always leaked to some degree (NZ is a 
coastal climate and capable of extreme climate variation), what was different 
and new and picked up by the survey was the significant percentage increase 
in cladding systems allowing moisture penetration into buildings in the period 
following the introduction of the Building Act in 1991.  
 
2. Government Legislative Initiatives 
The evidence provided by the report, and ongoing concern expressed by 
prominent members of the building community was such that the Government 
could not ignore the issue. In 2002 it set up an inquiry into the causes of 
building failure in NZ. The Overview Group on Weathertightness of Buildings 
(Hunn report) identified several reasons for poor performance, in particular  
 Inadequacy in the Building Code and Approved Documents  
 Insufficient checking at building consent stage.  
 Inadequacy of building products, materials and components 
including evaluation of their  suitability of fitness of purpose. [2] 
 
The public reaction to the Hunn Report was such that Government felt 
compelled to put into place additional procedures designed to restore public 
confidence in the building industry. Since the publication of the report, it has 
reviewed the Building Act 1991 and replaced it with the Building Act (2004). It 
has set up an adjudication and mediation strategies to resolve the many 
disputes relating to leaky homes, introduced a financial package to support 
homeowners undertaking repairs, and made building contractors agree to 
become licensed (LBPs) in order to undertake certain types of restricted work.  
 
3. The Building Amendment Bill (No 3).  
The main focus of the legislation was to “Signal more clearly accountabilities 
for designers, builders, building owners and building consent authorities in 
the day-to-day compliance for building work.”  [3] 
3.1 The Submission Process and Responses 
Submissions came from the many Territorial Authorities, City and District 
Councils making up the patchwork of Local Governance in New Zealand.  The 
breakdown of submissions is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Grouping  No.of Submissions 
Territorial Authorities (TAs) 24 
Building Organisations and Statuary Bodies 29 
Designers (Architects/Designers/Engineers) 11 
Building Contractors 2 
Private individuals 1 
 
Figure 1:  Submission Analysis: Building Amendment Bill (No 3). 
 
3.2  Territorial Authority Submissions: 
 
3.2.1 Accountability Issues. 
Whilst most TAs were generally supportive of the intent and aims of the Bill, 
an analysis of submissions to the Parliamentary Select Committee suggest  
considerable apprehensions about the readiness of the building community to 
take up the challenge posed by the new initiatives. The Upper Hutt City 
Council  spoke for many Territorial Authorities when it questioned the 
feasibility  of making individual stakeholders more accountable for their 
actions when the insurance and liability regime works against it.  The issues 
associated with  “leaking buildings” has put the operational procedures (or the 
lack of them) of the Territorial Authorities to the forefront. In many cases they 
have been found wanting. Legal redress by individuals under the present law 
of “joint and several liability”  has resulted in the TA (and hence the taxpayer) 
bearing the brunt of the costs for any successful litigation, out of proportion 
to the degree of fault, simply because they were the stakeholder with money 
and could not liquidate their assets to avoid responsibility. 
 
For this reason the TAs were keen to promote other forms of insurance, viz. 
“proportionate liability”. In this regime the injured party would receive “only 
the proportionate compensation directly attributed to that person responsible 
for the damage.”  This of course, whilst it would limit damages to those 
parties with deep pockets and “still standing,” such as the Territorial 
Authority,  would also mean the consumer would have to bear more of the 
costs of repair for any of the other parties who have gone out of business or 
otherwise escaped the legal net, and against whom proportionate blame was 
due. Suggestions to remedy this scenario included the need for a warrenty 
system for all building professionals, and in particular for the Licensed 
Building Practitioners, and to put in place educational systems to improve the 
quality and “the obligations and responsibilities of the professionals involved 
in building work.” A mandatory warranty scheme would “encourage building 
practitioners to ‘get it right’ first time and fix defects.” [4] 
 
Building Consent Authority submitters were almost unanimous in their desire 
to have this current system of liability changed and were critical in their 
submissions of this bill’s failure to categorically do so.  
 
3.2.2 Stepped Consenting.  
The intent of this aspect of the legislation is to enable Contractors, or as they 
are now called, Licensed Building Practitioners (LBP), to take complete 
responsibility for the construction of certain low risk building types (eg single 
storey dwellings) without having go through the building consent process. 
Most TAs were supportive of the development of “a more streamlined and 
targeted building regulatory system” as long as building quality was not 
compromised.  Some were critical of the fact “low risk” and “simple residential” 
were not defined and wanted to reserve judgement until the regulations 
clarifying the definition of these categories had been clarified. Clarification 
was also sought regarding TAs liabilities for these new low risk initiatives. 
 
The apprehension for many Territorial Authorities is they feel the quality of 
the builders (LBPs) that will carry out the work is suspect and that indeed, 
building performance will continued to be compromised, resulting in more of 
the same defective work that has cost the country so much to date. The 
Auckland Council’s stance in this regard is moderate and summarizes the 
feelings of many Territorial Authority submitters: 
 
…there is a concern that there are insufficient highly qualified and 
experienced builders and designers in the New Zealand market who 
are prepared to take on the responsibility of managing their own 
work without third party review. The Council encourages a gradual 
and stages approach to the proposed changes. [5] 
 
Councils were concerned that at the time of their submissions much of the 
finer points of the legislation had not been clarified, due to the fact that the 
supporting regulations for the Bill had not at the time of the submission 
process been finalised. The Tauranga City Council spoke for many when it 
expressed its concern at the lack of detail in this regard.  
 
The Council is extremely concerned that so much of the Bill leaves 
much of the detail around the types of consent, etc, to be made by 
regulations. [6] 
 
Examples are given around the lack of detail over what will in fact be defined 
as “low-risk building work” that the TAs will be responsible for approving. 
Most Territorial Authorities are extremely sensitive to issues of liability,  and 
are apprehensive that a lack of definition in this regard will open the door to 
new liabilities at a time when they are struggling to cope with present 
demands.  
 
3.3  Submissions from Building Organisations.  
A significant number of diverse building organisations, such as Registered 
Master Builders Federation of New Zealand (RMBF), Standards NZ, NZ Historic 
Places Trust and others also presented a variety of submissions to the 
Parliamentary Select Committee. 
 
Those closely related to building, such as the Registered Master Builders 
Federation (RMBF), were supportive of a clarification of responsibilitites and 
the risk-based, or “stepped” consenting process  that the Bill potentially 
afforded. However they too had issues with the timing. They too wanted  
liability reform (ie a change from the “joint and several” legal framework to 
that of “proportional liability”) to  be in place prior to any changes in 
responsibility to the individual building stakeholders taking place. Until such 
“critical aspects” were put in place the RMBF indicated it was reluctant to 
support the Building Amendment Bill.  
 
The RMBF submission sought to hightlight the role faulty cladding systems 
have played in the “leaking building” scenario, by suggesting product 
manufacturer’s ability to limit their liability for faulty materials to the cost of 
replacment (ie excluding consequential damage) be specifically prohibited in 
this legislation.  
  
A product manufacturer who manufactures a building product and 
gives advice and/or prepares technical data, plans and specifications in 
respect of that product is responsible for ensuring that the product 
will, if installed and maintained in accordance with the advice, 
technical data, plans and specifications provided perform as required 
by, and achieve its intended life as required by, the Building Code. [7] 
This brought a predictible response in a counter submission from the Building 
Industry Federation, an industry group representing supply merchants, 
manufacturers and others, with a claim that “..more often than not it [the lack 
of product performance] was more of a people problem..[and] there is enough 
legislation and regulation in place already.” [8].  
 
The exchange highlights the tensions that still exist between different factions 
of the building industry over the considerable angst caused by poor 
performing cladding systems in New Zealand and the ongoing perception that 
the manufacturers of these cladding systems have to date escaped the harsh 
consequences of material failure that building owners have had to face up to.  
 
3.4 Submissions From Designers: 
A small body of Designers, Architects and Engineers took the opportunity to 
offer submissions on the bill. Some had issue with the new definition of the 
designer’s role, which required the designer to produce drawings and 
specifications that “will result in’ the proposed building being Code compliant, 
thereby implying that the designer has control over the means and quality of 
construction required to achieve this end. Not so, suggest the submissions. 
This should be the responsibility of the Builder. 
 
Others had concern, similar to the majority of Territorial Authority and RMBF 
submissions, about the lack of any concrete move to “proportional liability” 
regime. A comparison was made of the moves central government and 
Territorial Authorities had instigated to limit their liability, notably through the 
10 year limitation period and the adoption of The Weathertight Homes 
Resolution Service (Financial Assistance Package) Amendment Bill –a voluntary 
opt-in measure for home owners which provided some Government monetary 
support but which limited Territorial Authority monetary exposure to 25% of 
the repair cost. This option was not available to designers, who “are often 
exposed to the severe risk of joint and several tort liability in building dispute 
litigation.”  Often in these instances, particularly where mediation is involved, 
“the niceties of the judicial system are often absent …and commercial 
bargaining-unrelated to fault, will drive settlement.” [9] 
 
Others in the industry interviewed separately suggest that the whole approach 
to minimizing risk, particularly risk to the Territorial Authority, is at the heart 
of the problem of responsible building. The Government was “focused on law 
and beating people into submission” to solve the problem of poor quality 
building. As a result Territorial Authorities were now “demanding and pedantic 
“ in their request for information, because [understandably] their own liability 
issues have demanded this approach. The result is designers now spend a lot 
of time providing information on “things that are not necessary”. [10] 
 
The solution suggested by this and other submitters, along with that of the NZ 
Institute of Architects, is to move to proportional liability, in tandem with a 
mandatory building performance warrenty scheme. 
 
The move to proportional liability is a key reform that would 
significantly decrease the undue burden placed on all parties when 
damages awarded against them significantly outweigh their level of 
involvement with the project. The current law has led to risk-averse 
behaviours that increased construction costs and decreased 
efficiency…[11] 
 
 If these initiatives are not enacted to protect the consumer, suggest the NZ 
Institute of Architects, then “the responsibilities of the BCAs [Territorial 
Authorities]should remain as is” and the proposed changes to the legislation 
should not proceed. [12] 
 
3.5 Submissions from Building Constractors: 
Only one submission was received by the Parliamentary Committee from a 
Building Contractor (Hawkins Construction). The lack of representation in this 
area by the building companies could indicate a certain fatigue with the 
ongoing submission process. Hawkin”s submission, whilst generally 
supportive of the bill was, like the building service organizations, critical of 
the lack of details surrounding the role and use of Producer Statements by 
BCAs and the lack of clarity regarding the testing of LBP competancies, items 
promised for clarification in the forthcoming regulations. The lack of these 
Regulations renders it “..not possible to determine the efficacy of the 
Amendment Bill..” [13]  
 
4. Conclusion  
The analysis of Parliamentary submissions indicated The Building Amendment 
Bill No 3 has the general support of the industry, but with qualifications. 
Apprehensions exist about the responsibilities of the designer and the poor 
quality of Licensed Building Practitioners (particularly as perceived by the 
Territorial Authorities) and their ability to take on the responsibilities 
necessary for even “low risk” self certification. The failure of the Bill to 
consider changes to the law as it applies to liability is another significant 
drawback to the effectiveness of the legislation. The establishment of a Code 
of Ethics for LPBs and legislation to clarify Warrant of Fitness requirements for 
buildings were non contentious and met with general approval.  
 
Whilst some of these measures outlined in this Building Amendment Act 2012 
will assist in accountability for future construction, none of the legislation has 
been of particular assistance to the owners of the many defective buildings 
already leaking, and who have, in spite of these initiatives, have been left 
largely to fend for themselves; their only recourse being litigation through the 
courts or mediation through the Weathertight Homes Tribunal. In either case, 
the outcome continues to be unsatisfactory to the owner and to the wider New 
Zealand community.  
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